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Bradford and Noland: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN—EXCEPT WHAT’S NEW
Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century, by Andrew L.
Oros. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017. 320 pages. $90.

Andrew Oros, director of international
studies at Washington College, opens
his new book provocatively, proclaiming that in security policy “Japan is
back.” He then describes a series of
government decisions made in the
last decade that indicate a shift away
from Japan’s postwar reliance on
soft power and economic diplomacy
toward a more pragmatic and militarized national security posture.
Oros uses the Western European Renaissance as a self-admittedly imperfect
framework for understanding the
threshold-crossing transitions that have
taken place within Japan’s incremental
evolution. He draws four general parallels between the two renaissances. First,
both situations blossomed after cultural taboos were challenged in public.
Second, both were directly related to
changes in the global order. Third, just
as Western Europe’s Renaissance was
entwined with a growth in interest in
the region’s classical legacy, many groups
in contemporary Japan are reevaluating
their views of history, particularly their
perspectives on the nation’s military
and cultural accomplishments. Finally,
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both transitional eras were marked by
significant advances in communications
technology that enabled a more rapid
exchange of ideas and greater access
for previously marginalized sections
of society to participate in political
discourse. In Europe, this technology
was the movable-type printing press; in
Japan, it is Internet-based social media.
A decade ago, Richard J. Samuels’s
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy
and the Future of East Asia (Cornell,
2007) described the nascent formation
of a new political consensus in Japan
under which realpolitik policies would
supplant the long-standing Yoshida
Doctrine as the nation’s predominant
security paradigm. Oros’s book focuses
on the years since the publication of
Securing Japan, a period bookended by
Shinzo Abe’s terms as prime minister, to
describe a Tokyo where such a consensus
has taken hold and the security community now partakes in “a level of realistic
and practical discussion of Japan’s
defense needs unimaginable in previous
decades.” Japan’s Security Renaissance
analyzes elements of this new consensus,
including a series of decisions ranging
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from the 2007 establishment of the
Ministry of Defense, the 2009 development of Japan’s first overseas military
base, the 2014 relaxation of arms-export
controls and a constitutional reinterpretation to allow the limited exercise
of collective self-defense, and the 2016
security legislation, to the continued
buildup of advanced defense systems.
The book also makes the important
point that this shift in thinking is
not confined to a handful of leaders
or a single political party, but is
influential across major parties and
throughout much of Japan’s policy
community. Oros explains that these
changes arrive in a context in which
Japan is viewed as a declining power
in Asia, and are underwritten by three
historical legacies: contested memories
of imperial Japan and the war, postwar
antimilitarism, and the unequal nature
of the alliance with the United States.
Organizing the book into six chapters,
Oros presents his argument in scholarly,
but never pedantic, writing. The reader
is impressed by the author’s knowledge
and benefits from his large network of
informed Japanese contacts. In addition,
his argument is both convincing and
of considerable significance, given that
in the same decade the Asian security
context has grown more complex. The
author’s largely positive conclusion
discusses implications for Japan,
the United States, the Asia-Pacific
region, and the rest of the world.
Oros also hints, however, at potential
uncertainty and risk ahead. Contemporary students generally view the
European Renaissance in a positive
light, as it gave rise to new ways of
thinking, including the empiricism
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that in turn sowed the seeds for the
Enlightenment. However, a thorough
analysis of the Renaissance shows that
the process was also painful, as seen
in the wars of religion that ravaged
Europe in the seventeenth century.
While Oros does not venture a value
judgment, he cautions the reader to
consider some of the more disturbing
possibilities this new renaissance may
bring for Japan, the United States,
and Asia’s delicate security balance.
The book is not without its faults.
It includes a chapter of theoretical
reflections that seems a bit misplaced.
That chapter’s discussions of political
worldviews lack the foundational
explanations needed by those without
training in international relations theory,
while the narrative descriptions of the
subsequent chapters will disappoint
academically inclined readers hoping
to learn Oros’s thoughts regarding
the conceptual implications of Japan’s
new security posture. Perhaps a more
vexatious complaint is that the author
relegates valuable information and
analysis to endnotes, which forces
the reader to flip pages continually or
risk missing some of the book’s most
insightful facts and assessments.
Still, this book will stand out as one
of the most important studies of the
Japanese security landscape published
in English in recent years. A highly
readable treatment of Japan’s last decade,
Japan’s Security Renaissance provides
a useful starting point for those
seeking to understand what is going
on in Japan and an essential read for
specialists keeping track of the many
changes in Asian security dynamics.
JOHN BRADFORD AND MATT NOLAND
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The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global
War against Radical Islam and Its Allies, by Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen. New York: St.
Martin’s, 2016. 208 pages. $26.99.

General Michael Flynn rose from
relative obscurity to become President
Donald Trump’s first national security
advisor—only to be forced to resign just
thirty-four days after Trump’s inauguration. While Flynn’s White House tenure
was brief, his views align with those
of Trump’s inner circle—few of whom
have public writings of their own.
Flynn’s 2016 book Field of Fight—part
memoir, part strategic vision—therefore
provides insight into a White House
that eschews foreign policy conventions.
Unfortunately, what Field of Fight
offers is a breathless portrayal of global
conspiracies and civilizational clash with
Islam, and policy recommendations
not developed much beyond slogans.
Michael T. Flynn is a career Army
intelligence officer (also an alumnus
of the Naval War College and a
Middletown, Rhode Island, native)
who reached the three-star rank of
lieutenant general. His coauthor,
Dr. Michael Ledeen, has authored
numerous books and articles on U.S.
Middle East policy. The two are listed
as coauthors, but the book is written in
Flynn’s first-person voice throughout.
The first third of Field of Fight is a
memoir of Flynn’s career. Of greatest
interest are Flynn’s assignments in Iraq
and Afghanistan, among them serving
as chief of intelligence for General
Stanley A. McChrystal. By all accounts,
Flynn played a key role in developing
intelligence-led, quick-exploitation
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operations. Flynn sketches his innovations, offers a few stories, and trumpets
his “maverick” nature and dislike of
rules. There are few new insights,
however. Those interested in the operational angle will find better treatments
in recent books by James Kitfield and
Sean Naylor or McChrystal’s memoir.
The book then shifts to the global threats
facing America. And a threatening world
it is, as Flynn and Ledeen see imminent
existential challenges from terror
groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah,
plus rogue nations such as Iran, Russia,
North Korea, China, Venezuela, Cuba,
and Bolivia. They contend that these
actors—Sunni and Shia, Levantine and
Latin—cooperate as an anti-U.S. axis.
While dissimilar states and groups do
sometimes have operational links—e.g.,
cooperation on sanctions busting—the
book’s portrayal of an axis is overdrawn.
Moreover, Flynn seems to use loudness
of rhetoric rather than capability to
measure threat. Near-peer China is
ignored, while worries about basket case
Venezuela are raised several times.
Flynn considers “radical Islam” the
primary danger, in that losing the
fight literally would mean the U.S.
government overthrown, ISIS’s flag
over the White House, and 350 million Americans either converted or
beheaded. Tautologically true, perhaps,
but laughable as serious threat assessment (one recalls the 1984 movie
Red Dawn). The definition of radical
Islam is slippery, but Flynn and Ledeen
place Iran squarely at the center. They
contend that the Shia-Sunni divide, let
alone ethno-national differences, means
little. ISIS and Al Qaeda are portrayed
as generally collaborating with senior

3

11/1/17 9:56 AM

162

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 11

partner Iran. (Who, then, has been fighting in Iraq and Syria is not clarified.)
Flynn claims to distinguish between
radical Islam and Islam as a whole, but
repeatedly blurs that line, building to a
four-page jeremiad on the “spectacular
failure” of the “Muslim world” writ large.
Flynn’s ultimate strategic concept is that
the United States ought to foster a theological “reformation” of Islam. Problems
with the parallel aside—the Christian
world engaged in global conquests after
the Reformation—Flynn recognizes that
the goal is aspirational. Our near-term
approach should be mostly political, he
writes. While Flynn emphatically wants
to “take the gloves off ” counterterror
operations, he opposes regime change
by military means, as occurred in Iraq
and Libya. Instead, top priority would
be political support of Iranian opposition groups (coauthor Ledeen long has
claimed the Iranian regime could be
brought down rapidly, à la 1989 in Eastern Europe). Overall, Flynn’s campaign
plans are vague and contradictory. The
threat is imminent and requires World
War II–style military mobilization, yet it
will involve a decades-long competition
of ideas. Promoting liberty and democracy is the key, but the United States
should back strongly such autocrats as
Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Flynn is
curiously opaque about the Saudis, and
ignores Turkey’s Islamist government).
Field of Fight was written after Flynn
became a contributor to Russia’s RT
network and appeared with Vladimir
Putin in Moscow, among the Russia
connections that eventually triggered
his resignation. Yet Flynn’s book has
few kind words for Russia: Moscow
is a leader in the anti-American axis,
Putin is an aggressor, and President
Obama failed to criticize Russia strongly

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/11

Winter2018Review.indb 162

enough. There are hints, though, that
Flynn sees potential for rapprochement.
He says Russia’s true interest would
be to join the United States against
Iran and radical Islam, but Russian
leaders suffer confusion from ingrained
anti-Americanism and a dearth—Flynn
asserts—of expertise on Islam. There is
no suggestion that other “axis” members
could be played against each other, nor
much discussed regarding potential
anti-Islamist allies such as India. Despite
those hints, the tone of Flynn the author
is hard to reconcile with the eager Russia
outreach of Flynn the adviser. Perhaps
the first-person voice obscures disagreement with coauthor Ledeen, who in
his own works is dubious of Moscow—
probably the more realistic view.
Overall, the book is thinly sourced.
Many claims simply are asserted, and the
few references often point to bloggers,
op-ed writers, or advocacy groups.
The book makes no pretense of being
scholarly, but even a general audience
would benefit from more evidence—and
more fact-checking. As one example,
Flynn and Ledeen claim that seven to
thirteen million people of Lebanese
ancestry live in the Brazil-ParaguayArgentina triborder region, whereas
the correct number is around 25,000.
As a work of strategy, Field of Fight is
forgettable. The literatures on jihadism,
Iran, illicit transnational networks,
etc., are replete with more-thoughtful,
well-researched works. The recommendations seem more intended to
back up campaign speeches than to
support actionable plans. As a window
into the Trump administration’s national
security thinking, the book provides
value—but not much reassurance.
DAVID T. BURBACH
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Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the
Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898, by Jon
Scott Logel. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ.
Press, 2016. 280 pages. $45.

The idea of civil-military relations
generally is framed in terms of the
relationship between the government of
a state and the military that serves that
state. Whether the construct is the objective control posed by Samuel Huntington
or the unequal dialogue of Eliot Cohen,
the discussion largely focuses on how
the civilian sector influences the actions
of the military. In his new volume,
Designing Gotham, Jon Scott Logel offers
a window on a long-neglected aspect
of the relationship: how the military
wields influence in civilian society.
The book begins with an interesting
account of the rise of Sylvanus Thayer
and his vision for refashioning West
Point into the first institution of higher
education in the United States dedicated
to teaching the principles of engineering. Professor Logel also discusses the
inherent tensions between Thayer’s
narrow view of a curriculum focused
on military engineering and the public
clamor of the Jacksonian era for West
Point to graduate engineers trained
in civil engineering. The compromise
solution—adding a limited number
of civil-engineering courses to the
program at the academy—set the stage
for the influence of West Pointers on
the development of New York City.
It is the influence of these men that
forms the core emphasis of the book.
Through a series of well-crafted
chapters, Logel describes the influence
of U.S. Military Academy graduates
on both the professionalization of
engineering and a series of projects
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that helped shape modern New York.
Tracing the progress of these public
works, the chapters also trace the social
and political changes in the relationship
between the military-trained engineers
and the civilian society in which they
moved. The dramatic increase in
political involvement by these officers
after the Civil War is another subtheme.
Weaving these ideas together, the book
offers an interesting social history of
the effects these military men had on
New York society and the effects society
had on these West Pointers. The cast of
characters is populated with men made
famous by the Civil War, such as George
B. McClellan and Fitz-John Porter, as
well as more-obscure graduates such as
Egbert L. Viele and John Newton, who
arguably were more important in the
development of the city’s infrastructure.
The author does not delve deeply into
the details of the engineering projects.
This is not necessarily a shortcoming,
as the development of engineering as
a profession, not its development as a
science, is a theme of the work. If the
book has a weakness, it is the graphics.
The only maps are reproductions of
Viele’s famous “Water Map” of 1865
and his plan for Central Park. A map
highlighting the various projects might
have been more valuable than the
common, recognizable photos of Porter
and McClellan that are included.
Jon Scott Logel has offered a unique
perspective on the relationship between
civil society and the graduates of West
Point. His insights remind us that, while
our civil government controls the military in the United States, our military
institutions have a powerful influence
on our society—recognized or not.
KEVIN J. DELAMER
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national French press and the archives
of the French navy (series BB4 1346).
Duel au large: La guerre de Sécession devant
Cherbourg (19 juin 1864); Enquête et récit, by
Jacky Desquesnes. Condé-sur-Noireau: Éditions
Charles Corlet, 2014. 247 pages. $20 paperback.

Jacky Desquesnes’s book on the Civil
War naval battle between CSS Alabama
and USS Kearsarge is a useful contribution to understanding that event. The
book’s publication coincided with the
150th anniversary of the battle, an event
the French press covered extensively in a
nationally circulated magazine, L’express,
and well-known regional newspapers
such as La Manche libre, La presse de la
Manche, and Ouest-France. Although the
book was published in France more than
three years ago by a regional publisher,
it seems to have been ignored entirely
in the United States and by American
naval historians. At the time of this
review’s writing, WorldCat showed only
one library in the United States that had
acquired a copy: Harvard University’s.
Numerous other books deal with this
subject—in English. The author has used
most of the standard American documentary sources in print, as well as the
digital materials now available online.
Among these are the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Navies
in the War of the Rebellion and the
published memoirs of the participants,
plus one unpublished memoir from the
collection at Mystic Seaport. While the
author does not cite all the published
secondary sources in English that he
might have used, the book’s importance
is in its use of French sources that
American scholars have consulted
only rarely. Chief among these are the
reports of the battle in the local and
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Desquesnes, currently a lecturer at
the Université populaire de Caen in
Normandy and formerly a regional
inspector of pedagogy, has placed his
subject in the wide context of the
Civil War, Franco-American relations,
international law, and the concept of
the duel. Many people at Cherbourg
observed the action, and their impressions appeared in the popular press.
In French eyes, Raphael Semmes
seemed a gentleman who fought the
battle like a classic duel, and the press
popularized this metaphor, which the
maritime prefect at Cherbourg used to
describe the action as he observed it.
In his closing chapter, Desquesnes
makes an important contribution in
discussing the cultural afterlife of the
battle in memory and commemoration.
In this, he places Édouard Manet’s masterful painting of the event within the
wider context of the popular images of
the day. He goes on to discuss the local
monuments, mentioning the unknown
grave site at Cherbourg of William
Carpenter of Alabama and the surviving
and restored monuments of George
Appleby, William Gowin, and Edward
King, along with the commemorations
held there over the years. Interestingly,
he points out connections that have
developed among these sites and those
of American war dead in other parts of
France, from John Paul Jones’s sailors at
Nantes to those lost in the First World
War. The volume ends with a brief
discussion of the work of Captain Max
Guérout of the French navy, the CSS
Alabama associations in Washington
and Paris, and the underwater archaeology that led to the recovery of many
objects from the wreck of Alabama.
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Jacky Desquesnes’s volume makes a
useful contribution to the literature,
one that deserves to be read more
widely by American naval historians.
It is also a reminder of the value and
importance of the insights for naval
history that are readily available in other
languages, but too often are overlooked.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence, ed. John Andreas Olsen. Whitehall
Paper 87. London: RUSI, released by Taylor and
Francis, 2017. 104 pages. $13.55 paperback.

As Russia’s naval posture and its restored
naval and air capabilities have become
more evident, the North Atlantic has
reemerged over the last couple of years
as a hot topic for researchers. For two
decades the region and the idea of highend naval threats to the NATO allies
were almost entirely off the table, but
the North Atlantic has reemerged as a
key topic in NATO headquarters as well.
Both the Wales Summit Declaration
(2014) and the Warsaw Summit Declaration (2016) bring forward the North
Atlantic as a renewed area of concern.
However, NATO and American allies
largely lack the capabilities to deal with
the increased threat that Russia’s new
and modernized capabilities pose. Russia’s long-term intentions are difficult
to assess, and most likely will change
over time anyway. Still, there are some
geopolitical constants, and it is possible
—and important—to notice, keep track
of, and understand the current threats
and potential future ones as they evolve.
Naval and air capabilities take a long
time to develop, with regard to both
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technology and competency. Naval
strategists and readers should reconsider
this reemerging challenge, and several
new reports from think tanks in the
United States and the United Kingdom
provide a good starting point.
Highly recommended are the following
recent publications: “Updating NATO’s
Maritime Strategy” (Atlantic Council,
2016); Undersea Warfare in Northern
Europe (CSIS, 2016); NATO and the
North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective
Defence (RUSI Whitehall Paper 87,
2017); and “Forgotten Waters: Minding
the GIUK Gap” (CNAS, 2017). Each of
these is beneficial, but readers should
note especially the present book under
review, NATO and the North Atlantic. It
is edited by John Andreas Olsen, contains a foreword by Philip M. Breedlove
and an introduction and conclusion by
Olsen, and consists of six chapters.
Olsen is an experienced book editor,
always getting high-level experts on
board his projects. For this project he
has created a good team of experienced
North Atlantic and Russian military
experts from both sides of the Atlantic.
The book connects historical and
geopolitical military perspectives with
more-current “post-Brexit” consequences and modern hybrid threats.
In his chapter, “The Significance of
the North Atlantic and the Norwegian
Contribution,” Rolf Tamnes brings back
the classical “bastion concept” for the
protection of Russian strategic submarines. Even though nuclear deterrence
has been off the radar of academics
and strategists for a couple of decades,
it has always “been there.” We clearly
should give more attention to this fact,
and try to understand and appreciate
how the nuclear deterrence forces of
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today shape how the great powers play,
be it in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere.
As John J. Hamre and Heather A. Conley
argue in their chapter, “The Centrality
of the North Atlantic to NATO and US
Strategic Interests,” the North Atlantic
is in fact the ocean that physically and
metaphorically binds North America
and Europe together. The book’s focus
and main themes are intended to explain
this to readers and to argue that NATO
must retain the capability to secure
freedom of maneuver across the sea
and keep the waterways between the
continents open for reinforcement and
resupply of matériel and personnel
in times of peace, crisis, and war. The
alliance, as a guarantor of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, must
be prepared to counter any potential
threat to the North Atlantic Ocean.
As do the studies recommended above
on Russia and the North Atlantic,
this project clearly points out Russia’s
increasingly provocative rhetoric and behavior over the last few years. Coupling
this with the fact that Russia has
introduced new classes of conventional
and nuclear attack submarines and is
modernizing its Northern Fleet through
the addition of long-range, highprecision missiles provides great reason
for concern. The Russian navy could
challenge NATO’s command of the
high seas, and thereby put both Europe
and North America at existential risk.
The book argues that now is the time
for NATO and American allies to get
a grip on the strategically important
North Atlantic Ocean, in addition to
the current, very Eurocentric focus on
air and land forces in the Baltic States
and on Russia’s land borders. The North
Atlantic is in fact the northwestern part
of the current NATO 360 perspective,
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but it needs to be reckoned as such. The
challenges in the North Atlantic are of a
very different nature from those NATO
experiences in the east and south, but no
less important. Arguably, in the longer
perspective, these high-end threats
may prove existential, and need to be
acknowledged. It takes a long time to
develop the countertechnologies and
expertise necessary to meet Russia’s
modernization of its submarines and
missile systems. Fittingly, the last
chapter before the conclusion and
recommendations is Admiral James
Stavridis’s “The United States, the North
Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare.”
In the concluding chapter, Olsen
offers some clear recommendations,
arguing that NATO should renew
its maritime strategy, reintroduce
extensive maritime exercises and
sustained presence, reform its command structure, invest in maritime
capabilities and situational awareness,
enhance maritime partnerships, and
prepare for maritime hybrid warfare.
Overall, this book provides an
excellent starting point from which
to start discussing the North Atlantic
challenges that are emerging as the
Russian naval (and air) forces continue to make considerable progress
toward modernizing for the future.
GJERT LAGE DYNDAL

The Leader’s Bookshelf, by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), and R. Manning Ancell. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages.
$29.95.

The Leader’s Bookshelf is unique in its
style and structure and outstanding in
its personal and confident presentation.
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There are literally hundreds of books
on leadership, including memoirs of
former CEOs, guidebooks to leadership from professional athletes, and
personal commentaries from men and
women who have succeeded in their
fields of business, education, politics,
and government; but this presentation
is different. Admiral Stavridis, whose
culminating military assignment was as
supreme allied commander at NATO,
and his highly competent coauthor,
R. Manning Ancell, have designed a
wide-ranging collection of books and
essays within a relatively brief volume
that exudes commitment to meeting the
challenges of leadership and confidence
regarding the qualities necessary.
The content and structure of the book
are what make it different, especially
worthwhile, and a great reading experience. The method taken was to invite
each of fifty different military leaders
to recommend his or her favorite book
on leadership and explain the reasons
for the choice. The coauthors add brief
comments about the book’s author
and the book itself, and select brief
quotations and passages from the
recommended work. But the heart of
the work is the “Leadership Lessons
Summarized,” which are developed and
summarized by Stravridis or Manning.
Suffice it to say, the quality and value of
these lessons learned are truly inspiring.
The range and diversity of the fifty
recommended books are remarkable.
Military leaders, mostly contemporaries
and colleagues of the coauthors, have
recommended authors and books as
varied as Rudyard Kipling’s Captains
Courageous and William Manchester’s
Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the
Pacific War. The recommended authors
include Carl von Clausewitz, Sun

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 167

B O O K R E V I E WS

167

Tzu, Mark Twain, S. L. A. Marshall,
Harper Lee, Thomas L. Friedman,
H. R. McMaster, and dozens more.
This book can be a great companion
on deployments—it can be rejoined
quickly after interruptions.
While the fifty presentations are
the heart of the book, much more is
included that is highly valuable but
unfortunately not discussed widely and
presented only infrequently. These five
brief chapters—“Reading Lists,” “Writing
and Publishing,” “What Young Leaders
Are Reading,” “Building a Personal
Library,” and “Reading and Writing: The
Big Lessons”—are the “secret passages”
to success, clues to how not just to get
promoted but to live an enriched and
meaningful life. These chapters show
Admiral Stavridis’s own passion and
commitment to his profession and his
important, mentor-like dedication to
midrange professionals who aim high
and try harder to become great leaders.
“But wait, there’s more!”—a bonus, so to
speak. An afterword offers an important
discussion of how more-formal literature, specifically poems and plays, can
provide valuable leadership lessons. In
“A Play and Two Poems,” Admiral Stavridis writes (p. 259), “In terms of impact,
word-for-word, a beautifully crafted
poem can deliver the most meaningful
of reading experiences and provide startling insights for a reader. Plays, which
are of course essentially scripts written
to be performed in front of us, often
give us powerful voices to listen to and
therefore sharpen our leadership skills.”
In a brief but brilliant analysis of The
Persians by Aeschylus, William Butler
Yeats’s poem “The Second Coming,” and
Constantine P. Cavafy’s poem “Sailing to
Ithaca,” Admiral Stavridis describes the
intense and deep revelation of meaning
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attained through creative literature and
recommends the challenge of developing an active, creative imagination in
reading intellectual literature as an
important role of leaders. He writes
(p. 266) that “in the end the very best
effective leaders use hope to inspire
us in the long voyages on which we all
must sail. Poems and plays each have
a role in helping leaders find their way
not only to challenges, but to hope.”
At a program sponsored by the Naval
War College Foundation a few years
ago, Admiral Stavridis commented that
during his tour of duty as Commander,
Southern Command, he arranged to
be tutored daily in Spanish because
he thought a better understanding of
the language essential to the success
of his mission. This was a singular
commitment to effective leadership,
just as The Leader’s Bookshelf is a
singular and valuable contribution
to developing effective leaders.
JOHN J. SALESSES

A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and
Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal
Navy, 1960–2015, by Anthony R. Wells. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 264 pages.
$35.

At its heart, this book both espouses
the value of a global maritime strategy
as seen from the perspective of two
historically close allies, Great Britain and
the United States, and acknowledges the
enormous costs of maintaining one. It is
not a history book, although it covers a
historical period and provides context.
It is more of a thematic illustration of
the extraordinary measures necessary—
across the entire span of professional
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and political discourses—to nurture and
maintain such partnerships. Above all,
it highlights the need for trust: a shared
understanding of goals and a willingness
to cooperate at all levels that rises above
what the author terms “the minefield
of opponents, skeptics and those with
ill-conceived agendas . . . who simply
have little or no knowledge of the basics
of maritime strategy.” Given the current
interest in enhancing naval presence
and the consequent drive toward an
enlarged naval fleet, this is a timely
message and one that deserves careful
consideration from naval professionals.
Anthony Wells is perhaps uniquely
qualified for this work. As an intelligence specialist, he has served both in
the Royal Navy (RN) in uniform and
later for the U.S. Navy as a civilian analyst, and has been involved personally in
much “special intelligence sharing at the
most sensitive levels.” His first chapter,
by far the most valuable, outlines the political changes that took place during the
1960s and ’70s, particularly in Britain,
that fundamentally altered the way in
which naval concerns were represented
to Parliament. He explains that although
both countries’ defense establishments
underwent considerable “centralization”
after the Second World War, the loss
of hundreds of years of naval influence
in the cabinet of Great Britain caused
by the sidelining of the First Lord of
the Admiralty in 1946 in favor of the
defense minister, and the eventual loss
of the service ministries altogether in
1964, was immensely damaging to the
maritime case. It is no coincidence,
for example, that these years saw
the reorientation of British defense
policy away from global responsibilities
and toward an exclusively northern
European focus. This in turn led to the
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demise of the RN aircraft carrier fleet
and loss of RN influence “east of Suez,”
adding to the urgency with which the
service sought partnerships with the
only global player remaining, the U.S.
Navy. Although similar “centralization”
efforts were under way in Washington,
Wells explains that the U.S. Navy was
inherently better served, in that the
crucial contact between senior serving
officers and their political masters was
preserved by virtue of the former’s
ability to testify to influential congressional committees. In this way, the
maritime case continued and continues
to be represented in Washington.
Throughout all these upheavals, the
real saving grace was the professional
links between the two navies that had
been forged during the dark years of the
world wars. The urgency of the Cold
War competition with Soviet Russia and
the need to know the opponent’s plans
years in advance meant that, to stay
ahead, the burgeoning technological
energy of the United States needed to
be combined with the long-established
human-intelligence resources of the
United Kingdom. To effect this, both
navies continued to talk, no matter
what tensions were extant nationally
and internationally at the time. As the
Soviets increasingly emphasized their
submarine fleet as a means by which to
conduct nuclear bargaining, Wells was in
a prime position to observe and record
this exchange. In the remaining chapters
he charts some of the high and low
points by way of illustration: the acoustic
refining of the nuclear submarine, the
use of maritime forces to signal resolve
during the Six-Day War of 1967, the
damage caused by the Walker spy ring,
and the extensive cooperation during the
Falklands War in 1982, to name a few.
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In the end, the sheer importance
of the subject matter and its timely
appearance will ensure wide readership of this book—which is a good
thing. Wells, although fluent, is not an
overly engaging writer, and the factual
nature of the prose can result in quite a
mouthful at times. That said, the work is
well researched and accurate, although
no doubt still limited by ongoing
classification issues. Uncharacteristically,
however, the normally flawless Naval Institute editorial process has allowed in a
few grammatical errors and, in the Falklands chapter, a minor inaccuracy. The
Argentines had four, not three, diesel
submarines in 1982: two Type 209s and
two old, ex-USN Balao-class Guppy II
conversions. Of these, only one of each
was serviceable, and ARA Santa Fe was
of the Balao class (ex–USS Catfish), not
a Type 209 as stated on page 147. Luckily, none of these errors detracts in any
way from the theme being presented.
This book should be read and
discussed by anyone with an interest
in maritime strategy or the “special
relationship” between the two countries.
This special relationship endures, of
course, and no doubt in a few years’
time—once the ships of the Queen
Elizabeth class and their F-35Cs are
in service—the next chapter in this
cooperative story will be told.
ANGUS ROSS

Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War
in Vietnam, by Mark Bowden. New York: Atlantic
Monthly, 2017. 610 pages. $30.

The United States first committed combatsize units (battalions or larger) to the
war in Vietnam in March 1965. In the
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years that followed, as the United States
assumed a greater role in the fighting, its
forces in theater continued to grow. By
early 1968, the United States had several
hundred thousand troops in Vietnam.

communist hands. It would take nearly
a month of bitter street fighting and
thousands of casualties (the vast majority to civilians) to return the city to the
control of South Vietnam’s government.

Concurrently, North Vietnam’s
leadership was supporting a growing communist insurgency in the
south—that of the Vietcong (VC)—the
goal of which was to defeat South
Vietnam and bring it under the North’s
communist regime. To accelerate this
process, North Vietnam developed an
elaborate plan to infiltrate thousands of
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops
into South Vietnam and, with the VC,
capture and hold South Vietnam’s major
cities and U.S. and South Vietnamese
military installations. No objective was
given a higher priority than the old
imperial Vietnamese capital of Hue.

Mark Bowden’s day-by-day chronicle of
the battle to retake Hue is detailed and
precise and covers both sides. He closely
follows Lieutenant Colonel Ernest “Big
Ernie” Cheatham, the commanding
officer of 2/5 (2nd Battalion, 5th Marine
Regiment), whose area of responsibility
was south of the Citadel and the Huong
River—an expanse that included Hue
University, the treasury building, the
provincial headquarters, a prison, a
hospital complex, and several other
structures. Cheatham’s basic tactic was
to employ tanks, self-propelled “Ontos”
antitank vehicles (each carried six deadly
106 mm recoilless rifles), bazookas,
81 mm mortars, flamethrowers, and
gas to destroy the buildings across
contested streets, while his young
infantrymen prepared for the assault.
It was an effective strategy: his rifle
companies were able to advance. It
took his battalion four days to fight
from Route 1 to the Phu Cam Canal.

The resulting Tet Offensive was, without
exception, a battlefield loss for NVA
and VC forces. However, Tet was a
decisive communist victory on the
political front: it turned the American
public irrevocably against the war.
America’s support for the Vietnam
conflict and its trust in its elected,
appointed, and military leaders—already
on shaky ground by early 1968—would
become permanent casualties of the
Tet Offensive and the battle for Hue.
In the early morning hours of January
31, 1968, the first day of Tet (the lunar
new year), nearly ten thousand welltrained, dedicated, and motivated NVA
and VC troops clandestinely moved
from neighboring forested highlands
into Hue. By noon, with the exception
of a couple of Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (i.e., ARVN) units and the
Military Advisory Command, Vietnam
(i.e., MACV) compound, the city was in
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On the other side, Bowden focuses on
VC lieutenant Hoang Anh De, commanding Battalion 55, who gave ground
only grudgingly. Like many of his fellow
NVA/VC leaders, as well as the senior
leadership in Hanoi, he soon realized
that the expected popular uprising was
not going to happen. However, like his
compatriots, he knew that the longer he
could keep the battle in Hue going, the
greater the political victory would be.
Combat operations for control of the
city continued until nearly the end of
February. Major Bob Thompson’s 1/1
(1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment),

12

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Bradford and Noland: Book Reviews

assigned the mission of retaking the
Citadel on February 11, suffered nearly
50 percent casualties by February 15.
Nonetheless, the battalion successfully
fought from the north to the south
Citadel walls, then west to retake the
royal palace and its grounds. Outside the
Citadel and to the northwest, elements
of the U.S. Army’s 1st Air Cavalry Division were assigned the task of attacking
the NVA Front’s command center in the
village of La Chu. One battalion suffered
50 percent casualties in the effort;
subsequent attacks prevailed as the communist forces initiated an orderly retreat.
While intelligence on the NVA/VC
forces that captured Hue was not good,
at least initially, Bowden nonetheless is
critical of the senior leaders who failed
to see the obvious. Of General William
C. Westmoreland he writes, “Never had
a general so effectively willed away the
facts.” Westmoreland simply refused to
accept that the NVA/VC actually had
captured the city. Bowden notes that
the general “continually and falsely
assured political leaders in Washington
and the public that the city had not
fallen into enemy hands.” Brigadier
General Foster C. LaHue, the commanding general of Task Force X-Ray
(Marines), was little better, insisting that
“there was nothing more threatening
in Hue than a handful of snipers.”
Bowden has crafted a comprehensive
and accurate account of the battle to
wrest Hue from the NVA and VC. In his
source notes he writes, “For a journalist
interested in history the sweet spot is
about 50 years. Enough time has gone by
for a measure of historical perspective
and yet there remain many living witnesses.” Bowden personally interviewed
hundreds of them, in the process
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crafting several compelling portraits
of the junior Marines who faced their
NVA/VC adversaries at very close range.
The testimonies of large numbers of
witnesses (in addition to unclassified
and formerly classified reports from the
National Archives, the Marine Corps
Library at Quantico, Virginia, and other
sources) serve to enhance the accuracy
of the narrative. And from what this
reviewer (who spent February 1968 in
Hue with 2/5) can tell, the accuracy of
Bowden’s narrative is unquestionable.
He has produced an excellent read of a
defining period in our nation’s history.
GEORGE HOFMANN

By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and
American Power in the Asia Pacific since 1783,
by Michael J. Green. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2017. 760 pages. $45.

In the fast-moving world of Washington,
DC, capturing and conveying the
context of policy choices challenge even
the most committed national security
professional. For busy senior officials,
policy can seem to exist in historical
isolation, with institutional memory
rarely extending before the start of
the current administration. Resources
for understanding rarely address the
contingencies and considerations that
drove those who went before us.
Michael Green, author of By More
Than Providence, confronted this
problem as senior director for Asia
on the National Security Council a
decade ago. Arriving as an academic
with a deep background in the region,
he nonetheless was challenged to place
proposed policy initiatives in the context
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of America’s long relationship with
Asia. On returning to academia, Green
set out to write the book he wished
he had had as a policy adviser. The
result is an extraordinary overview of
how America crafted itself as a Pacific
nation, gaining its unique position in the
region, as the title states, “by more than
providence.” Since its birth, America has
been tied to the Pacific by “commerce,
faith, geography, and self-defense” in a
dynamic interplay of interests, hopes,
and fears. The process of balancing these
forces is the focus of Green’s work, and
his approach underscores the imperfect
nature of any effort to address complex
goals in a region of such diversity.

U.S. grand strategy for the Pacific
region, tracing his influence through
to the present. More recently, the
Reagan administration’s Soviet-focused
Maritime Strategy had its intellectual
roots firmly in the Pacific as the then
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, sought to
address a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Hayward moved on to become Chief of
Naval Operations and, paired with John
Lehman as Secretary of the Navy, pushed
the strategy into global execution. Naval
professionals versed in military history
and security issues will benefit from
the book’s integrated and thoughtful
discussion of economic and cultural ties.

The overall U.S. policy focus historically
has swung between Europe and Asia,
with Europe benefiting from linguistic
and cultural affinities among American
elites. Within Asia, U.S. policy makers
have cycled between China and Japan
when prioritizing relations. These
fundamental choices, still at play in
the region, date to the earliest days of
the United States. In considering this
dynamic, Green benefits from his early
academic career as a Japan specialist. In
an increasingly China-focused field, this
distinctive background allows him to
place America’s critical relationship with
Japan in proper context and provides
an antidote to recent works that place
too much emphasis on China issues.

By More Than Providence provides a
balance between conceptual argument
and the details of historic events. For
example, while placing Nixon’s opening
to China in broad context, Green also
provides an excellent articulation of the
assumptions behind the negotiation and
signing of the Shanghai Communiqué.
His personal experience in the policy
arena has given him a sympathetic ear
for the challenges our predecessors
faced and their often-imperfect efforts.
There is criticism of many decision
makers across numerous eras, but always
tempered with a welcome sense that
meaningful statecraft is simply hard.
Despite that fact, America has achieved
and sustained a unique position in the
Pacific. Green’s sense of contingency—
that events could have unfolded very
differently and the U.S. position in the
region might be weaker or nonexistent
—presents the American reader with
a clear if implied challenge: how to
maintain this legacy going forward.

Even well-read naval professionals will
be struck by the central role that maritime issues and the U.S. Navy play in the
narrative. From the creation of the first
USN Pacific squadron in 1821, naval
leaders have been a key outward face of
the nation to the region and one of the
constant interlocutors in internal U.S.
debates. Indeed, Green credits Mahan
with articulating the first comprehensive
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At well over seven hundred pages and
exquisitely sourced with notes and
comments, By More Than Providence
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represents a substantial investment
of time and effort for the thoughtful
reader. It is, however, an essential book
for any naval professional who wants
to understand what lies in our wake
before charting our course in Asia.
DALE C. RIELAGE

The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945, by Peter Hennessy and James
Jinks. London: Penguin, 2015. 864 pages. £30.

The Silent Deep is a tell-all history of the
Royal Navy’s submarine service since
World War II. The authors were granted
almost unlimited access to Royal Navy
(RN) historical files of submarine operations. The discussion of formerly classified operational surveillance patrols off
the North Cape of Norway and of the
trailing of Soviet nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) is
eye-opening. As a former USN submarine commanding officer—and a veteran
of eight covert surveillance operations in
the Pacific during the Cold War—I was
stunned to read about British submarine
operations in the “other ocean.”
The book is much more than that,
though. It begins with a description
of the “Perisher” (slang name for the
Submarine Command Course), a
demanding five-month-long training
program for potential submarine commanding officers. Successful graduates
normally go on to command; those
dropped for lack of demonstrated ability
generally leave the submarine service.
The authors describe the startling effect
on the Royal Navy of gaining access
to German submarine technology
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at the end of World War II and the
ensuing revelation of the very advanced
submarines that were being prepared to
attack Allied warships and shipping. The
German Type XXI high-speed, longendurance, diesel-electric submarine was
arguably the first modern submarine—a
truly submersible warship. By the war’s
end over a hundred Type XXIs were
working up in the Baltic Sea, but they
made no operational patrols. In fact,
only one operational patrol was made
by a boat of this class—U-2511—and
the war ended before it could make an
attack. (A number of Type XXIIIs, the
smaller clones of the Type XXIs, did
make operational patrols and sank nine
ships without loss to their own ranks.)
The Type XXI boat was the model for
postwar development of advancedcapability diesel-electric submarines
in three navies: the British Porpoise
class, the Soviet Whiskey class, and
the American Tang class.
Another German revelation was the
Walther boat, a hydrogen peroxide–
fueled true submarine, which had not
yet become operational. A captured
Walther-class submarine, U-1407, was
commissioned as HMS Meteorite, and
its trials led to the construction and
commissioning of HMS Excalibur
and HMS Explorer, both powered
by Walther-cycle machinery. They
turned out to be a dead end, however,
as technical problems and financial
concerns ended the experiments.
The authors also cover the Royal
Navy’s first looks at nuclear power for
submarines and its temporary abandonment in favor of the Walther-cycle
propulsion plant. When that avenue
proved fruitless, the Royal Navy then
turned to the United States—which had
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put the first nuclear-powered submarine,
USS Nautilus (SSN 571), to sea in 1955.
In a major exercise named RUM TUB in
October 1957, Nautilus showed convincingly that RN antisubmarine warfare
ships and aircraft were totally unable
to detect and track an SSN, owing to
its almost unlimited endurance.
The British decisions to acquire
SSNs and subsequently SSBNs are
discussed in separate chapters, each
offering an in-depth look at the design,
engineering, management, and political
aspects of the respective programs.
The Falklands War of 1982 offered
an opportunity for the Royal Navy
to employ SSNs in a limited-area,
limited-combat role. The Royal Navy’s
SSNs were the first British warships on
scene after the Argentine invasion of
the Falkland Islands. They provided
essential surveillance and intelligence
reporting about Argentine forces. On
May 2, 1982, HMS Conqueror sank ARA
General Belgrano, an Argentine navy
light cruiser, south of the Falklands.
That sinking effectively drove other
Argentine navy units back inside their
twelve-mile limit, a boundary British
SSNs were not allowed to penetrate—a
political constraint the British placed
on themselves, and one that was very
frustrating to SSN commanding officers
who were anxious to engage Argentina’s
aircraft carrier, which posed a significant
threat to the British surface task force.
The reviewer was fortunate to have had
lunch recently with HMS Conqueror’s
navigating officer and to query him directly about the decision of Conqueror’s
commanding officer to use Second
World War–vintage Mark 8 torpedoes
instead of the much more advanced
Mark 24 Tigerfish torpedoes—a decision
discussed in the Falklands chapter.
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Subsequent chapters deal with the
complicated internal British politics of
upgrading the Royal Navy’s submarine
deterrent force from Polaris to
Poseidon, and finally to current-day
Trident missiles, as well as the continuing operations vis-à-vis Russia.
This is an outstanding book, well
researched and ably written. I highly
recommend it for anyone interested in
submarine operations or antisubmarine
warfare or both. It is a must-read.
JOHN F. O’CONNELL

21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Sea
Power in the Modern Era, ed. Kevin Rowlands.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 192
pages. $21.95 paperback.

The published works of Soviet fleet
admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov,
whose naval career spanned three
decades, are ostensibly the subject of
this volume edited by the Royal Navy’s
Kevin Rowlands. Yet the book also could
serve as a blueprint for increasing naval
prestige, power, and influence. Through
the focus on Gorshkov’s writing, the
reader is afforded an insider’s view
of the Soviet navy’s post–World War
and Cold War–era growth. At the
same time, Rowlands is interested
in how consideration of Gorshkov
can help inform questions about the
future roles and uses of naval force.
Admiral Gorshkov graduated from
the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad
in 1931 and showed early promise
as a naval officer. His role in the
Second World War was as impressive
as his peacetime advancement. Unlike
many of his peers, Gorshkov not only
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achieved great responsibility as a young
officer but was able to weather the
many changes in the Soviet political
environment and emerged as a leading
practitioner and theorist of Soviet naval
strategy. In essence, Admiral Gorshkov’s
performance as a naval officer becomes
a model for all who aspire to make a
lasting contribution to the naval profession and to the security of one’s country.
Perhaps Admiral Gorshkov’s major
military contribution was making the
Soviet navy the most powerful navy in
Russian history. For example, prior to
his leadership the Soviet navy basically
had as its major responsibility coastaldefense matters, but Admiral Gorshkov
changed that by building the service’s
capabilities and expanding its role to
worldwide responsibility and activity. By
modernizing the navy and adopting new
technological devices, he substantially
increased its power, enabling it to take
a first-class position in the world. He
constantly tested new naval capabilities
and adjusted to make improvements,
recognizing that there were good
reasons to do so; after all, other nations
were making important and substantial
changes to their navies. Gorshkov’s
skills helped the Soviet Union achieve
remarkable influence in the world; his
bureaucratic skills also helped him gain
respect and cooperation when he was
involved with military representatives
of other countries. The importance of
this characteristic is becoming quite
evident in today’s American military.
Admiral Gorshkov was also a patient
politician regarding his role as a naval
leader. “When cuts had to be made, he
made them. When there were opportunities for growth, he took them” (p. 5).
In addition, he had the ability—even
when the Soviet navy appeard to be
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discredited, as in the case of the Cuban
missile crisis—to adjust to new highranking political leaders who were in a
position to replace him if they thought
it necessary to do so. His ability to make
known in speeches and writings the
important role that a navy can play in
expanding the power and influence of a
country, as well as defending it against
potential enemies, was also an asset to
him. Yet the admiral also knew that war
was not the only context in which a navy
could be useful. Even in peacetime it was
important to have a strong navy, because
possession of such could give a country
important advantages, such as prestige
and potential. Interestingly, “Gorshkov’s
genius was not simply to grow his
Navy, it was to justify its existence as
an arm of the state in peacetime and
in operations that fell short of all-out
war” (p. 10). He was truly an effective
advocate for his chosen profession.
Realistically, this book will be a guide
to nations whose intentions include
expanding their influence on a global
scale via the use of a navy. Although
there may be a number of countries
in this category, China and India are
current examples. Yet perhaps a major
benefit of the book is that it provides
a learning experience for future naval
officers who aspire to a high military
position in which they will encounter
many challenges similar to those
Admiral Gorshkov faced, despite the
changing complexities of naval military
activity. We always can learn from the
past. Hence, a new generation of officers
may be helped in the future by becoming aware of the challenges Admiral
Gorshkov faced and how he overcame
them to make the Russian navy one
of the strongest in the world today.
WILLIAM E. KELLY
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